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Abstract—In this paper, we examine the physical layer security
for cooperative wireless networks with multiple intermediate
nodes, where the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol is considered.
We propose a new joint relay and jammer selection (JRJS)
scheme for protecting wireless communications against eaves-
dropping, where an intermediate node is selected as the relay for
the sake of forwarding the source signal to the destination and
meanwhile, the remaining intermediate nodes are employed to
act as friendly jammers which broadcast the artificial noise for
disturbing the eavesdropper. We further investigate the power
allocation among the source, relay and friendly jammers for
maximizing the secrecy rate of proposed JRJS scheme and
derive a closed-form sub-optimal solution. Specificially, all the
intermediate nodes which successfully decode the source signal
are considered as relay candidates. For each candidate, we derive
the sub-optimal closed-form power allocation solution and obtain
the secrecy rate result of the corresponding JRJS scheme. Then,
the candidate which is capable of achieving the highest secrecy
rate is selected as the relay. Two assumptions about the channel
state information (CSI), namely the full CSI (FCSI) and partial
CSI (PCSI), are considered. Simulation results show that the
proposed JRJS scheme outperforms the conventional pure relay
selection, pure jamming and GSVD based beamforming schemes
in terms of secrecy rate. Additionally, the proposed FCSI based
power allocation (FCSI-PA) and PCSI based power allocation
(PCSI-PA) schemes both achieve higher secrecy rates than the
equal power allocation (EPA) scheme.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, relay selection, jammer
selection, eavesdropping, secrecy capacity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
DUE to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, theconfidentiality of wireless communications is vulnerable
to an eavesdropping attack [1]. Physical layer security is
emerging as a promising paradigm against eavesdropping and
has attracted considerable attention recently. Different from
the conventional encryption methods [2], it mainly exploits
the physical characteristics of wireless channels to enhance
the security of the signal transmission from its source to
the intended destination. Physical layer security work was
pioneered by Wyner for a discrete memoryless wiretap
channel [3], which later on, was extended to a Gaussian
wiretap channel in [4]. The secrecy capacity which is the
maximum of secrecy rate was developed to evaluate the
physical-layer security performance. In [4], it showed that the
secrecy capacity can be expressed as the difference between
the channel capacity from source to destination (referred to
as main channel) and the channel capacity from source to
eavesdropper (called wiretap channel) in the presence of an
eavesdropper.
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [5]-[11] has been
widely considered as an effective way to improve physical
layer security by exploiting multiple antennas at both the
transmitter and the receiver. However, due to the battery power
and terminal size limitations, it may be difficult to implement
multiple antennas in some cases e.g. handheld terminals
and wireless sensors. As a consequence, node cooperation is
considered to be an effective means of enhancing the secrecy
capacity by allowing the network nodes to share each other’s
antennas [12]-[31]. Generally, there are two efficient ways
to make use of multiple intermediate nodes: cooperative
beamforming and cooperative jamming. To be specific,
cooperative bearmforming helps to improve the capacity
of main channel, which may include relay selection and
beamforming [12]-[18]. By contrast, cooperative jamming
aims to degrade the capacity of the wiretap channel by
sending artificial noise to interfere with the eavesdropper
without affecting the legitimate destination [19]-[21]. Both
cooperative beamforming and jamming are capable of
increasing the secrecy capacity of wireless communications
in the presence of an eavesdropper.
In [12] and [13], the authors studied the cooperative
beamforming and cooperative jamming separately, where all
the intermediate nodes are used either to assist the source
transmission or to send a jamming signal for interfering with
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the eavesdropper. The transmit power at the source and the
weights of intermediate nodes are determined to maximize
the secrecy rate subject to a total power constraint. In [14],
an optimal relay selection scheme was proposed by taking
into account the channel state information (CSI) of both
the main channel and wiretap channel, which is shown to
achieve a better security performance than the conventional
relay selection and combining methods. Almost meanwhile,
cooperative jamming was also studied for increasing the
secrecy rate. In [19], optimal cooperative jamming was
studied with an emphasis on how to guarantee a positive
secrecy rate. In [20], the use of a jammer was proposed
to send artificial noise along with confidential signal for
confusing the wiretap link and enhancing the main link
simultaneously.
The aforementioned studies are based on the ideal
assumption that the instantaneous CSI of both main and
wiretap links are known. Considering that obtaining the
instantaneous CSI of the wiretap channel is challenging in
many cases, Y. Su et al. [22] investigated the relay selection
and power allocation by assuming that the correlation between
the real and outdated CSIs is known without requiring the
instantaneous CSI. In [23], X. Gong et al. presented a robust
relay beamforming scheme which maximizes the worst-case
transmit power of the artificial noise with imperfect CSI.
Moreover, in [24], F. S. Al-Qahtani et al. studied the impact
of CSI feedback delay on the secrecy performance of three
different diversity combining methods under the imperfect
CSI case. In addition, C. Wang et al. [25] investigated the
relay selection and power allocation between two sources
and mulitiple relays for a two-way amplify-and-forward (AF)
wireless network based on statistical channel information.
In order to take both advantages of cooperative
beamforming and cooperative jamming, various joint
relay selection and jamming (JRJS) schemes were proposed
for further enhancing the wireless secrecy performance, where
some intermediate nodes help the legitimate transmission
while some other nodes may jam the eavesdropper [26]-[31].
More specifically, the authors of [26] and [27] selected
one intermediate node as the relay and two other nodes
as jammers in a two-way cooperative network, achieving a
better secrecy performance than conventional non-jamming
schemes. Two different channel knowledge assumptions
were considered in [27]: 1) an instantaneous CSI of the
eavesdropping channel is assumed to be known, and 2) only
an average CSI of the wiretap channel is known. By contrast,
in [28] and [29], one intermediate node was chosen as the
jammer to send artificial noise and the other intermediate
nodes were considered to be relays for data transmission.
A second-order convex cone programming algorithm was
proposed in [29] to obtain sub-optimal beamforming weights
and power allocation without eavesdropper’s CSI. In [30],
an intermediate node that achieves the highest instantaneous
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the second hop was selected as
the relay and a node of minimizing the interference imposed
on the destination was used as the jammer, where an outdated
estimated CSI is assumed. Additionally, an opportunistic
relaying scheme with the artificial jamming was proposed
in [31], where the power allocation between the confidential
signal and jamming signals is optimized to maximize the
ergodic secrecy rate.
In this paper, we propose a new JRJS scheme to enhance
the physical layer security. Specifically, an intermediate node
which can successfully decode the source signal is selected
to act as the relay for assisting the source transmission, while
the remaining intermediate nodes are employed as friendly
jammers to transmit null-steering artificial noise for confusing
the eavesdropper without affecting the legitimate destination.
We select one intermediate node as the relay to exploit the
full spatial diversity and the others as jammers for the sake
of reducing the complexity of JRJS without an extra jammer
selection. In addition, if we select multiple intermediate
nodes as the relays to help signal transmission in different
channels, there would be more links where the eavesdropper
can tap the legitimite transmission. Moreover, if the multiple
relays share a common channel to forward their re-encoded
outcomes, the corresponding symbol-level synchronization
among the spatially distributed relays is very complex.
Considering that the secrecy performance would be affected
by the power allocation among the source, relay and jammers,
we further formulate a power allocation optimization problem
to maximize the secrecy rate of the proposed JRJS scheme
subject to a total power constraint and derive a closed-form
sub-optimal power allocation solution. It is noted that the total
power constraint is widely used in literature e.g., [12]-[13],
[15]-[17], [21], [25] and [30]-[31]. In our proposed JRJS
scheme, the relay selection and power allocation are jointly
optimized by taking into account both the transimission
rate and secrecy rate. Since the instantaneous CSI may be
unavailable in some practical scenarios, we consider two
different CSI cases in this paper, which are called the full
CSI (FCSI) and partial CSI (PCSI), respectively. The FCSI
assumes that the instantaneous CSI of both main channel and
wiretap channel is known, while the PCSI only requires the
main channel’s instantaneous CSI along with the statistical
wiretap channel knowledge.
The main contributions of our work are summarized as
follows.
Firstly, the relay and jammer selection as well as the power
allocation are jointly carried out to maximize the secrecy
rate of legitimate transmission. To be specific, for each relay
candidate, we derive an optimal power allocation solution
and obtain the corresponding secrecy rate result. After that,
the candidate that maximizes the secrecy rate is selected as
the relay. Secondly, considering that the secrecy performance
would be affected by the power allocation among the source,
relay and jammers, we formulate a power allocation problem
for maximizing the secrecy rate of proposed JRJS scheme
subject to a total power constraint. Moreover, we derive
closed-form sub-optimal solutions to the formulated power
allocation problem under FCSI and PCSI assumptions,
respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the system model and secrecy rate analysis are
presented. In Section III, we derive the power allocation
schemes under the FCSI and PCSI assumptions, respectively.
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Numerical evaluation results are described in Section IV and
main conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
A. System Model
We consider a decode-and-forward (DF) cooperative wire-
less network consisting of one source S, one destination D
and M intermediate nodes in the presence of an eavesdropper
E as shown in Fig. 1. Each node in the whole network is
only equipped with a single antenna. The solid and dash
lines represent the main and wiretap links, respectively. Both
the main and wiretap links are modeled as Rayeigh fading
channels and the thermal noise received at any node is modeled
as a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and
variance σ2n . We assume that there is a direct link from the
source to the eavesdropper and no direct link from the source
to the destination. M intermediate nodes are exploited to assist
the signal transmission from the source to the destination.
In this paper, we propose a new JRJS scheme, where the
intermediate nodes are divided into two groups: one relay node
R and M − 1 jammers Ji, i = 1, 2, ...,M − 1, as shown
in Fig. 1. More specifically, in the first phase, the source
node broadcasts a signal s with power Ps to M intermediate
nodes, which all attempt to decode their received signals.
Due to the broadcasting nature, the signal s is also received
by the eavesdropper. For convenience, the intermediate nodes
which succeed in decoding the source signal are denoted
by a decoding set D. In the second phase, we select one
intermediate node from D as the relay R to re-encode and
transmit its decoded outcome to the destination with power
Pr. Meanwhile, the remaining M − 1 intermediate nodes are
enabled to act as friendly jammers Ji, i = 1, 2, ...,M − 1, to
transmit artificial noise zi for confusing the eavesdropper. We
assume that the distances among intermediate nodes are much
smaller than the distances between intermediate nodes and the
source/destination/eavesdropper following [30]. This assump-
tion is reasonable for both WSNs and MANETs associated
with a clustered relay configuration. Under this assumption,
the corresponding path losses among the relay and jammers are
approximately the same, hence we simplify our work without
considering path loss.
In this paper, we assume that the whole wireless network
is to operate under a total power constraint following [12]-
[13], [15]-[17], [21], [25] and [30]-[31], which is widely
adopted in both secrecy performance analysis and optimal
design. For example, as indicated in [17], half of the maximum
power budget is allocated to the two transceivers and the
remaining half will be shared among all the relay nodes for
symmetric relaying schemes. In [30], it pointed out the secrecy
performance is effected by power allocation between the relay
and jammers. Futhermore, from a network design of view,
such an assumption allows to optimize total power consumed
in the whole network. In addition, the solved transmit power
at the relay also provides a guideline for the transmit power
of individual relays. The optimal power allocation among the
source, relay and jammers will be addressed in following
Section III.
In the first phase, the source transmits a signal s(E(|s|2) =
Fig. 1. A cooperative wireless network consisting of one source, one
destination, one eavesdropper and M intermediate nodes.
1) with power Ps. The intermediate node i and eavesdropper
E thus receive
yi =
√
Pshsis+ ni (1)
y(1)e =
√
Pshses+ n
(1)
e (2)
where hsi and hse represent a fading coefficient of the channel
from the source to the intermediate node i and eavesdropperE,
respectively, ni ∈ CN (0, δ2n) is additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at the intermediate node i, and n(1)e ∈ CN (0, δ2n) is
AWGN at E.
In the second phase, the relay R is selected from the
decoding set D for signal transmission with power Pr . Mean-
while, each jammer Ji transmits an artificial noise signal zi.
It needs to be pointed out that the vector of the artificial noise
z = [z1 z2 ... zM−1]
T should be normalized. The total
transmit power at all the jammers is denoted as Pz . Therefore,
the received signal at the destination is expressed as
yd =
√
Prhrds+
∑
i=1,2,...,M−1
√
Pzhjidzi + nd (3)
where hrd represents a fading coefficient of the channel from
the relay R to destination, hjid represents a fading coefficient
of the channel from the jammer Ji to destination and nd ∈
CN (0, δ2n) represents AWGN at the destination. The received
signal at the eavesdropper is expressed as
y(2)e =
√
Prhres+
∑
i=1,2,...,M−1
√
Pzhjiezi + n
(2)
e (4)
where hre represents a fading coefficient of the channel from
the relay to eavesdropper, hjie represents a fading coefficient
of the channel from the jammer Ji to eavesdropper and
n
(2)
e ∈ CN (0, δ2n) represents AWGN at the eavesdropper.
For simplicity, let us define hd =
[hj1d hj2d ... hjM−1d]
H and he =
[hj1e hj2e ... hjM−1e]
H
. Considering that the artificial
noise should not interfere with D, we design z as a
normalized signal onto the null space of hd so that
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS (ACCEPTED TO APPEAR) 4
h
H
d z =
∑
i=1,2,...,M−1 hjidzi = 0. As a consequence, we
obtain (3) and (4) as
yd =
√
Prhrds+ nd (5)
and
y(2)e =
√
Prhres+
√
Pzh
H
e z + n
(2)
e (6)
which completes the signal modeling of the JRJS scheme.
B. Secrecy Rate Analysis
In [32], a variable transmission parameter scheme where the
source and relay use different codebooks with different code
rates is proposed for DF relay networks to further improve
the secrecy performance. In [33], a framework is provided
to determine the wiretap code rates to achieve the locally
maximum effective secrecy throughput. In this paper, we still
consider the case where the source and relay transmit signal
using the same code with the same code rate Rd in both main
and wiretap links and focus on how to allocate transmit power
among the source, relay and all the jammers to maximize the
secrecy rate of the proposed JRJS scheme. Although we do not
propose a new transmission parameter design scheme in this
paper, we take into account the effect of Rd on the secrecy
rate and set Rd to different values based on the values of
P
δ2
n
by experimental experience, which will be shown in the
following experimental section.
When the source and relay transmit the same code with Rd,
the rate of DF transmission from source S via the relay R to
destination D, Cd, is obtained as
Cd = min(Csr , Crd) (7)
where Csr and Crd represent the rate of the link from S to R
and the rate of the link from R to D, respectively, which are
given as
Csr =
1
2
log2(1 +
|hsr|2Ps
δ2n
) (8)
and
Crd =
1
2
log2(1 +
|hrd|2Pr
δ2n
). (9)
It is noted that the relay R is selected from the decoding set
D. That is, it satisfies that
log2(1 +
|hsr|2Ps
δ2n
) ≥ Rd. (10)
Combining (7)-(9), the rate of the link from S to D is given
by
Cd =
1
2
log2(1 +
min(|hsr |2Ps, |hrd|2Pr)
δ2n
). (11)
Combing (5) and (6), we obtain the rate of the link from S
to E as
Ce =
1
2
log2(1 +
|hse|2Ps
δ2n
+
|hre|2Pr
δ2n + Pzh
H
e zz
Hhe
). (12)
For simplicity, let us define the instantaneous SNR at destina-
tion as a function of the relay R, Ps and Pr
γd(R,Ps, Pr) =
min(|hsr|2Ps, |hrd|2Pr)
δ2n
(13)
and the instantaneous SNR at eavesdropper as a function of
R, Ps, Pr and Pz
γe(R,Ps, Pr, Pz) =
|hse|2Ps
δ2n
+
|hre|2Pr
δ2n + Pzh
H
e zz
Hhe
. (14)
Combining (11)-(14), the secrecy rate of the source-destination
transmission relying on the proposed JRJS scheme is given by
Cs = (Cd − Ce)+ = 1
2
log2(
1 + γd(R,Ps, Pr)
1 + γe(R,Ps, Pr, Pz)
)+ (15)
where (.)+ is a function such that (x)+ = x if x > 0 and
(x)+ = 0 if x ≤ 0.
III. POWER ALLOCATION OF PROPOSED JRJS SCHEME
A. FCSI based Power Allocation (FCSI-PA) Scheme
In this subsection, we focus on how to select the optimal
relay R and allocate the optimal transmit power Ps, Pr and
Pz to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate stated as (15)
assuming the avaibility of global instantaneous CSI. The as-
sumption is reasonable in some cases [34]-[36]. For example,
we consider the scenario in which a legal user in the wireless
network is captured by Trojan and slaved as an eavesdropper
to tap the signal transmission. In this case, a broadcasting
network consisting of multiple legal receivers among which
some are slaved by Trojan and become eavesdroppers, turns
into a wiretap system, where the global instantaneous CSI of
the eavesdroppers may be available. For another example, in a
scenario where a single active eavesdropper is registered in the
wireless network as a subscribed user and exchanges signaling
messages with the source and intermediate nodes, the global
instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper may be known.
Under the FCSI assumption, the joint relay selection and
power allocation problem can be formulated as
(R∗, P ∗s , P
∗
r , P
∗
z ) = arg max
i,Ps,Pr,Pz
1 + γd(i, Ps, Pi)
1 + γe(i, Ps, Pi, Pz)
s.t. Ps + Pr + Pz = P
Ps ≥ 0, Pr ≥ 0, Pz ≥ 0
log2(1 +
|hsi|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd
(16)
where P is the total power budget for transmitting one source
symbol, which is also the sum of the transmit power at the
source, relay and jammers. Problem (16) can be performed in
two steps. At the first step, each intermediate node i in the
decoding set D is treated as a candidate of relay. For each
candidate i ∈ D, we solve the following power allocation
problem to maximize the secrecy rate of the corresponding
JRJS scheme,
(P ∗si, P
∗
ri, P
∗
zi) = arg max
Ps,Pr,Pz
1 + γd(i, Ps, Pr)
1 + γe(i, Ps, Pr, Pz)
s.t. Ps + Pr + Pz = P
Ps ≥ 0, Pr ≥ 0, Pz ≥ 0
log2(1 +
|hsi|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd.
(17)
At the second step, the candidate which leads to the maximum
of the secrecy rate results with the optimal power allocation
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solution above is selected as the relay R. That is,
R∗ = argmax
i∈D
1 + γd(i, P
∗
si, P
∗
ri)
1 + γe(i, P ∗si, P
∗
ri, P
∗
zi)
. (18)
Then, the optimal power allocation solution of the proposed
JRJS scheme is the solution of problem (17) when the candi-
date is R∗.
It is noted that problem (18) can be easily solved by simple
comparison. Therefore, we focus on how to solve problem
(17). Without loss of generality, we denote the candidate of
relay as R. Let us define λe = hHe zzHhe. Then, due to
Pz = P − Ps − Pr, problem (17) can be rewritten as (19).
Due to
min(
|hsr |2Ps
δ2n
,
|hrd|2Pr
δ2n
)=
{
|hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
if |hsr|2Ps ≤ |hrd|2Pr
|hrd|
2Pr
δ2
n
if |hsr|2Ps ≥ |hrd|2Pr
,
(20)
(19) can be broken down into two sub-problems, which are
given by (21) and (22).
As f1(Ps, Pr) is a decreasing function of Pr, Pr should be
minimized in order to maximize f1(Ps, Pr). Due to the condi-
tion |hsr|2Ps ≤ |hrd|2Pr in problem (21), we can easily obtain
Pr ≥ |hsr|
2
|hrd|2
Ps. Thus, we set Pr = |hsr|
2
|hrd|2
Ps to obtain a sub-
optimal solution of problem (21). Combining Pr = |hsr|
2
|hrd|2
Ps
and Ps+Pr ≤ P , we have Ps ≤ |hrd|
2
|hsr|2+|hrd|2
P . Additionally,
due to log2(1+
|hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd, we can obtain Ps ≥ 2Rd−1|hsr|2 δ2n.
Then, problem (21) becomes (23) where
Pb1 =
2Rd − 1
|hsr|2 δ
2
n (24)
and
Pb2 =
|hrd|2
|hsr|2 + |hrd|2P. (25)
Note that we should use
Rd ≤ log2(
|hsr|2|hrd|2
|hsr|2 + |hrd|2
P
δ2n
+ 1) (26)
for signal transmission since Pb1 ≤ Pb2. The corresponding
sub-optimal transmit power at R and all the jammers is
P
opt
rR =
|hsr|
2
|hrd|2
P
opt
sR and P
opt
zR = P − P optsR − P optrR .
For simplicity, define α1 = |hsr|
2
|hrd|2
+ 1, β1 =
|hsr|
2|hre|
2
|hrd|2
,
µ1 = Pλe + δ
2
n, θ1 = µ1δ
2
n, φ1 = µ1|hsr|2 − α1δ2nλe,
τ1 = α1λe|hsr|2, φ2 = µ1|hse|2 − α1δ2nλe + β1δ2n and
τ2 = α1λe|hse|2. Then, g1(Ps) can be rewritten as
g1(Ps) =
θ1 + φ1Ps − τ1P 2s
θ1 + φ2Ps − τ2P 2s
. (27)
By taking the derivative of g1(Ps) with respect to Ps, we
obtain
dg1(Ps)
dPs
=
(τ2φ1 − τ1φ2)P 2s + 2(τ2 − τ1)θ1Ps + (φ1 − φ2)θ1
(θ1 + φ2Ps − τ2P 2s )2
.
(28)
As |hse|2 is not equal to |hsr|2 generally, it always satisfies
that τ2 − τ1 6= 0. Thus, when τ2φ1 − τ1φ2 = 0, the solution
of dg1(Ps)
dPs
= 0 is easily obtained as
P
p-opt1
sR =
φ2 − φ1
2(τ2 − τ1) . (29)
Then, the solution of problem (23) is
P opt1sR = arg max
Ps∈{P p-opt1sR ,Pb1,Pb2}
Ps∈[Pb1,Pb2]
g1(Ps) (30)
where {x1, x2, ..., xn} denotes a set consisting of elements
x1, x2, ..., xn.
Now we discuss the solution of problem (23) when τ2φ1−
τ1φ2 6= 0. Define q1(Pr) = (τ2φ1 − τ1φ2)P 2s + 2(τ2 −
τ1)θ1Ps+(φ1−φ2)θ1. The discriminant of q1(Pr) is obtained
as
∆1 = (2(τ2 − τ1)θ1)2 − 4(τ2φ1 − τ1φ2)(φ1 − φ2)θ1. (31)
When ∆1 > 0, the solutions of dg1(Ps)dPs = 0 are obtained as
P p-opt2sR =
−2(τ2 − τ1)θ1 +
√
∆1
2(τ2φ1 − τ1φ2) (32)
and
P
p-opt3
sR =
−2(τ2 − τ1)θ1 −
√
∆1
2(τ2φ1 − τ1φ2) . (33)
Then, the solution of problem (23) is
P opt2sR = arg max
Ps∈{P p-opt2sR ,P p-opt3sR ,Pb1,Pb2}
Ps∈[Pb1,Pb2]
g1(Ps). (34)
When ∆1 = 0, the solution of dg1(Ps)dPs = 0 is
P p-opt4sR =
(τ1 − τ2)θ1
τ2φ1 − τ1φ2 . (35)
Then, the solution of problem (23) is
P opt3sR = arg max
Ps∈{P p-opt4sR ,Pb1,Pb2}
Ps∈[Pb1,Pb2]
g1(Ps). (36)
When ∆1 < 0, dg1(Ps)dPs = 0 has no solutions. Then, the
solution of problem (23) is
P opt4sR = arg max
Ps∈{Pb1,Pb2}
g1(Ps). (37)
Next, we will discuss the solution of sub-problem (22) in a
similar way. As f2(Ps, Pr) is a decreasing function of Ps, Ps
should be minimized in order to maximize f2(Ps, Pr). Due
to the condition |hsr|2Ps ≥ |hrd|2Pr in problem (22), we set
Ps =
|hrd|
2
|hsr|2
Pr to obtain a sub-optimal solution of problem
(22). Combining Ps = |hrd|
2
|hsr|2
Pr and Ps + Pr ≤ P , we have
Pr ≤ |hsr|
2
|hsr|2+|hrd|2
P . Additionally, due to Ps = |hrd|
2
|hsr|2
Pr and
log2(1+
|hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd, we can obtain Pr ≥ 2Rd−1|hrd|2 δ2n. Then,
problem (22) becomes (38) where
Pb3 =
2Rd − 1
|hrd|2 δ
2
n (39)
and
Pb4 =
|hsr|2
|hsr|2 + |hrd|2P. (40)
We can have that (26) still holds due to Pb3 ≤ Pb4. Then, the
corresponding sub-optimal transmit power at the source and all
the jammers is P optsR = |hrd|
2
|hsr|2
P optrR and P
opt
zR = P −P optsR −P optrR .
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(P ∗sR, P
∗
rR) = arg max
Ps,Pr
f(Ps, Pr) =
1 +min( |hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
, |hrd|
2Pr
δ2
n
)
1 + |hse|
2Ps
δ2
n
+ |hre|
2Pr
δ2
n
+(P−Ps−Pr)λe
s.t. Ps + Pr ≤ P
Ps ≥ 0, Pr ≥ 0
log2(1 +
|hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd.
(19)
(P ∗sR, P
∗
rR) = arg max
Ps,Pr
f1(Ps, Pr) =
1 + |hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
1 + |hse|
2Ps
δ2
n
+ |hre|
2Pr
δ2
n
+(P−Ps−Pr)λe
s.t. Ps + Pr ≤ P
Ps ≥ 0, Pr ≥ 0
log2(1 +
|hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd
|hsr|2Ps ≤ |hrd|2Pr
(21)
(P ∗sR, P
∗
rR) = arg max
Ps,Pr
f2(Ps, Pr) =
1 + |hrd|
2Pr
δ2
n
1 + |hse|
2Ps
δ2
n
+ |hre|
2Pr
δ2
n
+(P−Ps−Pr)λe
s.t. Ps + Pr ≤ P
Ps ≥ 0, Pr ≥ 0
log2(1 +
|hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd
|hsr|2Ps ≥ |hrd|2Pr.
(22)
P optsR = arg max
Ps
g1(Ps) =
1 + |hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
1 + |hse|
2Ps
δ2
n
+
|hre|2
|hsr |2
|hrd|
2 Ps
δ2
n
+(P−Ps−
|hsr |2
|hrd|
2 Ps)λe
s.t. Pb1 ≤ Ps ≤ Pb2 (23)
For simplicity, define α2 = |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
+ 1, β2 =
|hrd|
2|hse|
2
|hsr|2
,
φ3 = µ1|hrd|2 − α2δ2nλe, τ3 = α2λe|hrd|2, φ4 = µ1β2 −
α2δ
2
nλe + |hre|2δ2n and τ4 = α2β2λe. Then, g2(Pr) can be
rewritten as
g2(Pr) =
θ1 + φ3Pr − τ3P 2r
θ1 + φ4Pr − τ4P 2r
. (41)
By taking the derivative of g2(Pr) with respect to Pr, we
obtain
dg2(Pr)
dPr
=
(τ4φ3 − τ3φ4)P 2r + 2(τ4 − τ3)θ1Pr + (φ3 − φ4)θ1
(θ1 + φ4Pr − τ4P 2r )2
.
(42)
As |hse|2 is not equal to |hsr|2 generally, it always satisfies
that τ4 − τ3 6= 0. Thus, when τ4φ3 − τ3φ4 = 0, the solution
of dg2(Pr)
dPr
= 0 is obtained as
P p-opt1rR =
φ4 − φ3
2(τ4 − τ3) . (43)
Then, the solution of problem (38) is
P opt1rR = arg max
Pr∈{P p-opt1rR ,Pb3,Pb4}
Pr∈[Pb3,Pb4]
g2(Pr). (44)
Now we discuss the solution of problem (38) when τ4φ3−
τ3φ4 6= 0. Define q2(Pr) = (τ4φ3 − τ3φ4)P 2r + 2(τ4 −
τ3)θ1Pr+(φ3−φ4)θ1. The discriminant of q2(Pr) is obtained
as
∆2 = (2(τ4 − τ3)θ1)2 − 4(τ4φ3 − τ3φ4)(φ3 − φ4)θ1. (45)
When ∆2 > 0, the solutions of dg2(Pr)dPr = 0 are obtained as
P p-opt2rR =
−2(τ4 − τ3)θ1 +
√
∆2
2(τ4φ3 − τ3φ4) (46)
and
P p-opt3rR =
−2(τ4 − τ3)θ1 −
√
∆2
2(τ4φ3 − τ3φ4) . (47)
Then, the solution of problem (38) is
P
opt2
rR = arg max
Pr∈{P p-opt2rR ,P p-opt3rR ,Pb3,Pb4}
Pr∈[Pb3,Pb4]
g2(Pr). (48)
When ∆2 = 0, the solution of dg2(Pr)dPr = 0 is
P p-opt4rR =
(τ3 − τ4)θ1
τ4φ3 − τ3φ4 . (49)
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P
opt
rR = argmax
Pr
g2(Pr) =
1 + |hrd|
2Pr
δ2
n
1 +
|hse|2
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
Pr
δ2
n
+ |hre|
2Pr
δ2
n
+(P−Pr−
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
Pr)λe
s.t. Pb3 ≤ Pr ≤ Pb4 (38)
Then, the solution of problem (38) is
P
opt3
rR = arg max
Pr∈{P p-opt4rR ,Pb3,Pb4}
Ps∈[Pb3,Pb4]
g2(Pr) (50)
When ∆2 < 0, dg2(Pr)dPr = 0 has no solutions. Then, the
solution of problem (38) is
P opt4rR = arg max
Pr∈{Pb3,Pb4}
g2(Pr). (51)
It is noted that problem (30), (34), (36), (37), (44), (48), (50)
and (51) can be easily solved by simple comparison.
In summary, the sub-optimal solution of problem (19),
(P ∗sR, P
∗
rR), is stated in TABLE I, and correspondingly, P ∗zR =
P − P ∗sR − P ∗rR.
B. PCSI based Power Allocation (PCSI-PA) Scheme
Considering that it is generally difficult to obtain the instan-
taneous CSI of the wiretap channel in many practical cases, we
propose a PCSI based power allocation (PCSI-PA) scheme in
this subsection. We assume that the fading coefficient hse and
hie are complex Gaussian randoms with zero mean value and
variance ǫ1 and ǫ2, respectively, that is, E [hse] = E [hie] = 0,
E
[|hse|2] = δ2se = ǫ1 and E [|hie|2] = δ2ie = ǫ2.
As the CSI of the wiretap channel is unavailable, it is
infeasible to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate stated
in (15). Thus, we aim to maximize the average secrecy rate
of the source-destination transmission E [Cs] = E [Cd − Ce].
Due to
E [Cd − Ce] = lim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
l=1
[Cdl(l)− Cel(l)] (52)
= lim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
l=1
[Cdl(l)− ρ(l)E [Ce]]
where Cdl(l) and Cel(l) denote the instantaneous channel
capacity of the main link and wiretap link at time l, respec-
tively, and ρ(l) is a weighting factor satisfying that ρ(l) ≥
0,
L∑
l=1
ρ(l) = L. Thus, (52) can be optimized by maximizing
Cdl(l)− ρ(l)E [Ce] for each l by finding the optimal ρ(l) and
the optimal transmit power at the source and relay. Since it
is difficult to obtain the optimal value of ρ(l) for each l, we
turn to use Cdl(l)−E [Ce] as an objective function instead by
simply setting ρ(l) = 1 for each l. As the optimization of ρ(l)
is not taken into account, we aim to obtain a lower bound of
E [Cd − Ce] by using the objective function Cdl(l)− E [Ce].
For simplicity, we denote Cdl(l) uniformly as Cd without
loss of generality. As log2(x) is a concave function of x, due
to Jensen’s inequality, we have
E [Ce] = E [log2(1 + γe(i, Ps, Pr, Pz))] (53)
≤ log2(1 + γ¯e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz))
where γ¯e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz) is expressed as
γ¯e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz) = E [γe(i, Ps, Pr, Pz)] (54)
=
Ehse
[|hse|2]Ps
δ2n
+ E
[ |hre|2Pr
δ2n + Pzh
H
e zz
Hhe
]
=
ǫ1Ps
δ2n
+ E
[ |hre|2Pr
δ2n + Pzλe
]
.
Defining eE =
E
[
1
δ2
n
+Pzλe
]
− 1
δ2
n
+Pzǫ2
1
δ2
n
+Pzǫ2
, we can represent eE
as
eE =
E
[
1
δ2
n
+Pzλe
− 1
δ2
n
+Pzǫ2
]
1
δ2
n
+Pzǫ2
(55)
= E
[
ǫ2 − λe
δ2
n
Pz
+ λe
]
.
Moreover, we can obtain the mean of λe as
E [λe] = E
[
h
H
e zz
H
he
]
= E
[
M−1∑
i=1
hjiezi
M−1∑
i=1
(hjiezi)
H
]
(56)
= E
M−1∑
i=1
|hjie|2|zi|2+
M−1∑
i1=1
M−1∑
i2=1,i2 6=i1
(hji1ezi1)(hji2ezi2)
H

= E
[
M−1∑
i=1
|hjie|2|zi|2
]
=
M−1∑
i=1
E
[|hjie|2] |zi|2
= ǫ2
M−1∑
i=1
|zi|2 = ǫ2.
It can be observed from (55) and (56) that, when the variance
of λe tends to 0, the random variable λe converges to its mean
ǫ2, leading to the fact that E
[
1
δ2
n
+Pzλe
]
approaches 1
δ2
n
+Pzǫ2
.
Fig. 2 illustrates the values of eE versus the variance of λe in
the cases of P
δ2
n
= 0 dB, P
δ2
n
= 10 dB and P
δ2
n
= 20 dB. In the
simulation, Pz is set to a random value in [0, P ].
Thus, when the variance of λe is small, E
[
1
δ2
n
+Pzλe
]
can
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TABLE I
SUB-OPTIMAL SOLUTION OF PROBLEM (19)
condition sub-optimal solution
τ2φ1 − τ1φ2 ∆1 τ4φ3 − τ3φ4 ∆2 others (P ∗sR, P
∗
rR
)
0 − 0 − f(P opt1
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
) ≥ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt1
rR
, P
opt1
rR
)
(P
opt1
sR
, |hsr |
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
)0 − 6= 0 > 0 f(P opt1
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
) ≥ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt2
rR
, P
opt2
rR
)
0 − 6= 0 0 f(P opt1
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
) ≥ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt3
rR
, P opt3
rR
)
0 − 6= 0 < 0 f(P opt1
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
) ≥ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt4
rR
, P
opt4
rR
)
6= 0 > 0 0 − f(P opt2
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
) ≥ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt1
rR
, P
opt1
rR
)
(P
opt2
sR
,
|hsr |
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
)6= 0 > 0 6= 0 > 0 f(P opt2
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
) ≥ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt2
rR
, P opt2
rR
)
6= 0 > 0 6= 0 0 f(P
opt2
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
) ≥ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt3
rR
, P
opt3
rR
)
6= 0 > 0 6= 0 < 0 f(P opt2
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
) ≥ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt4
rR
, P opt4
rR
)
6= 0 0 0 − f(P opt3
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
) ≥ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt1
rR
, P opt1
rR
)
(P opt3
sR
, |hsr |
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
)6= 0 0 6= 0 > 0 f(P
opt3
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
) ≥ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt2
rR
, P
opt2
rR
)
6= 0 0 6= 0 0 f(P opt3
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
) ≥ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt3
rR
, P opt3
rR
)
6= 0 0 6= 0 < 0 f(P
opt3
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
) ≥ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt4
rR
, P
opt4
rR
)
6= 0 < 0 0 − f(P opt4
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
) ≥ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt1
rR
, P
opt1
rR
)
(P
opt4
sR
,
|hsr |
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
)6= 0 < 0 6= 0 > 0 f(P
opt4
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
) ≥ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt2
rR
, P
opt2
rR
)
6= 0 < 0 6= 0 0 f(P
opt4
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
) ≥ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt3
rR
, P
opt3
rR
)
6= 0 < 0 6= 0 < 0 f(P
opt4
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
) ≥ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt4
rR
, P
opt4
rR
)
0 − 0 − f(P opt1
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
) ≤ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt1
rR
, P
opt1
rR
)
(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt1
rR
, P
opt1
rR
)6= 0 > 0 0 − f(P opt2
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
) ≤ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt1
rR
, P
opt1
rR
)
6= 0 0 0 − f(P opt3
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
) ≤ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt1
rR
, P
opt1
rR
)
6= 0 < 0 0 − f(P opt4
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
) ≤ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt1
rR
, P opt1
rR
)
0 − 6= 0 > 0 f(P opt1
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
) ≤ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt2
rR
, P opt2
rR
)
( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt2
rR
, P opt2
rR
)6= 0 > 0 6= 0 > 0 f(P
opt2
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
) ≤ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt2
rR
, P
opt2
rR
)
6= 0 0 6= 0 > 0 f(P opt3
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
) ≤ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt2
rR
, P opt2
rR
)
6= 0 < 0 6= 0 > 0 f(P
opt4
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
) ≤ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt2
rR
, P
opt2
rR
)
0 − 6= 0 0 f(P opt1
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
) ≤ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt3
rR
, P
opt3
rR
)
(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt3
rR
, P
opt3
rR
)6= 0 > 0 6= 0 0 f(P opt2
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
) ≤ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt3
rR
, P opt3
rR
)
6= 0 0 6= 0 0 f(P
opt3
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
) ≤ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt3
rR
, P
opt3
rR
)
6= 0 < 0 6= 0 0 f(P
opt4
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
) ≤ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt3
rR
, P
opt3
rR
)
0 − 6= 0 < 0 f(P opt1
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt1
sR
) ≤ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt4
rR
, P opt4
rR
)
(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt4
rR
, P
opt4
rR
)6= 0 > 0 6= 0 < 0 f(P
opt2
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt2
sR
) ≤ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt4
rR
, P
opt4
rR
)
6= 0 0 6= 0 < 0 f(P
opt3
sR
,
|hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt3
sR
) ≤ f(
|hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P
opt4
rR
, P
opt4
rR
)
6= 0 < 0 6= 0 < 0 f(P opt4
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt4
sR
) ≤ f( |hrd|
2
|hsr |2
P opt4
rR
, P opt4
rR
)
be approximated by 1
δ2
n
+Pzǫ2
. Then, we have
E
[ |hre|2Pr
δ2n + Pzλe
]
= E
[|hre|2Pr]E [ 1
δ2n + Pzλe
]
(57)
≈ E [|hre|2Pr] 1
δ2n + Pzǫ2
=
ǫ2Pr
δ2n + Pzǫ2
.
Combining (54) and (57), γ¯e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz) can be approxi-
mately expressed as
γ¯e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz) ≈ γ˜e = ǫ1Ps
δ2n
+
ǫ2Pr
δ2n + Pzǫ2
(58)
when the variance of λe is small.
From (53) and (58), we have
Cd − E [Ce] ≥ Cd − log2(1 + γ˜e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz)) (59)
= log2(
1 + γd(i, Ps, Pr)
1 + γ˜e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz)
).
Therefore, we aim to maximize the lower bound of Cd −
E [Ce], that is, log2(
1+γd(i,Ps,Pr)
1+γ˜e(i,Ps,Pr ,Pz)
), which is proved to be
effective in our experiments.
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Fig. 2. An illustrstion of the values of eE versus the variance of λe in the
cases of P
δ2
n
= 0 dB, P
δ2
n
= 10 dB and P
δ2
n
= 20 dB.
The PCSI-PA problem can be formulated as
(R∗, P ∗s , P
∗
r , P
∗
z ) = arg max
i,Ps,Pr ,Pz
1 + γd(i, Ps, Pr)
1 + γ˜e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz)
s.t. Ps + Pr + Pz = P
Ps ≥ 0, Pr ≥ 0, Pz ≥ 0
log2(1 +
|hsi|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd
(60)
which can be solved in a similar way as problem (16).
For each candidate of relay i ∈ D, the power allocation
problem is formulated as
(P ∗si, P
∗
ri, P
∗
zi) = arg max
Ps,Pr,Pz
1 + γd(i, Ps, Pr)
1 + γ˜e(i, Ps, Pr, Pz)
s.t. Ps + Pr + Pz = P
Ps ≥ 0, Pr ≥ 0, Pz ≥ 0
log2(1 +
|hsi|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd
(61)
and the relay is determined as
R∗ = arg max
i∈D
1 + γd(i, P
∗
si, P
∗
ri)
1 + γ˜e(i, P ∗si, P
∗
ri, P
∗
zi)
(62)
which can be also easily solved by simple comparison.
Since Ps +Pr +Pz = P , problem (61) can be rewritten as
[P ∗sR, P
∗
rR]=arg max
Ps,Pr
f˜(Ps, Pr)=
1 +min( |hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
, |hrd|
2Pr
δ2
n
)
1 + ǫ1Ps
δ2
n
+ ǫ2Pr
δ2
n
+(P−Ps−Pr)ǫ2
s.t. Ps + Pr ≤ P
Ps ≥ 0, Pr ≥ 0
log2(1 +
|hsr|
2Ps
δ2
n
) ≥ Rd.
(63)
We can obtain a sub-optimal solution of problem (63) in a
similar way as that in Section III.A.
Define β3 = |hsr|
2ǫ2
|hrd|2
, µ2 = Pǫ2 + δ
2
n, θ2 = µ2δ
2
n, φ5 =
µ2|hsr|2 − α1δ2nǫ2, τ5 = α1ǫ2|hsr|2, φ6 = µ2ǫ1 − α1δ2nǫ2 +
β3δ
2
n, τ6 = α1ǫ1ǫ2, ∆3 = 4(τ6−τ5)2θ22−4(τ6φ5−τ5φ6)(φ5−
φ6)θ2 and g3(Ps) = θ2+φ5Ps−τ5P
2
s
θ2+φ6Ps−τ6P 2s
. Then, we have
P p-opt5sR =
φ6 − φ5
2(τ6 − τ5) , (64)
P opt5sR = arg max
Ps∈{P p-opt5s ,Pb1,Pb2}
Ps∈[Pb1,Pb2]
g3(Ps), (65)
P p-opt6sR =
−2(τ6 − τ5)θ2 +
√
∆3
2(τ6φ5 − τ5φ6) , (66)
P p-opt7sR =
−2(τ6 − τ5)θ2 −
√
∆3
2(τ6φ5 − τ5φ6) , (67)
P opt6sR = arg max
Ps∈{P p-opt6sR ,P p-opt7sR ,Pb1,Pb2}
Ps∈[Pb1,Pb2]
g3(Ps), (68)
P p-opt8sR =
(τ5 − τ6)θ2
τ6φ5 − τ5φ6 , (69)
P opt7sR = arg max
Ps∈{P p-opt8sR ,Pb1,Pb2}
Ps∈[Pb1,Pb2]
g3(Ps), (70)
and
P opt8sR = arg max
Ps∈{Pb1,Pb2}
g3(Ps). (71)
Define β4 = |hrd|
2ǫ1
|hsr|2
, φ7 = µ2|hrd|2 − α2δ2nǫ2, τ7 =
α2ǫ2|hrd|2, φ8 = β4µ2 − α2δ2nǫ2 + ǫ2δ2n, τ8 = α2ǫ2β4,
∆4 = 4(τ8 − τ7)2θ22 − 4(τ8φ7 − τ7φ8)(φ7 − φ8)θ2 and
g4(Pr) =
θ2+φ7Pr−τ7P
2
r
θ2+φ8Pr−τ8P 2r
. Then, we have
P p-opt5rR =
φ8 − φ7
2(τ8 − τ7) , (72)
P
opt5
rR = arg max
Pr∈{P p-opt5r ,Pb3,Pb4}
Pr∈[Pb3,Pb4]
g4(Pr), (73)
P p-opt6rR =
−2(τ8 − τ7)θ2 +
√
∆4
2(τ8φ7 − τ7φ8) , (74)
P p-opt7rR =
−2(τ8 − τ7)θ2 −
√
∆4
2(τ8φ7 − τ7φ8) , (75)
P opt6rR = arg max
Pr∈{P p-opt6r ,P p-opt7r ,Pb3,Pb4}
Pr∈[Pb3,Pb4]
g4(Pr), (76)
P p-opt8rR =
(τ7 − τ8)θ2
τ8φ7 − τ7φ8 , (77)
P opt7rR = arg max
Pr∈{P p-opt8r ,Pb3,Pb4}
Ps∈[Pb3,Pb4]
g4(Pr) (78)
and
P
opt8
rR = arg max
Pr∈{Pb3,Pb4}
g4(Pr). (79)
We state the sub-optimal solution of problem (63) in TABLE
II and then the sub-optimal total transmit power at all the
jammers P ∗zR is P − P ∗sR − P ∗rR.
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TABLE II
SUB-OPTIMAL SOLUTION OF PROBLEM (63)
condition sub-optimal solution
τ6φ5 − τ5φ6 ∆3 τ8φ7 − τ7φ8 ∆4 others [P ∗sR, P
∗
rR
]
0 − 0 − f˜(P opt5
sR
, |hsr|
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt5
sR
) ≥ f˜( |hrd|
2
|hsr|2
P
opt5
rR
, P
opt5
rR
) [
P opt5
sR
, |hsr |
2
|hrd|
2 P
opt5
sR
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IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section presents the numerical secrecy rate results
of our proposed JRJS schemes using FCSI-PA and PCSI-
PA strategies. Pure relay selection, pure jamming, generalized
singular-value-decomposition (GSVD) based beaforming and
JRJS schemes using equal power allocation (EPA) are used
as benchmark schemes. In our numerical experiments, we
have E(|hsi|2) = E(|hid|2) = 1, E(|hse|2) = ǫ1 = 1,
E(|hie|2) = ǫ2 = 1 and δ2n = 0 dBm. We show that the
proposed JRJS scheme outperforms the pure relay selection,
pure jamming and GSVD based beamforming schemes. Also,
our proposed FCSI-PA and PCSI-PA schemes both perform
better than the EPA strategy in terms of secrecy rate. Moreover,
numerical results illustrate that with an increasing number of
intermediate nodes, the secrecy rates of the proposed JRJS
schemes using FCSI-PA and PCSI-PA strategies increase.
We first discuss the effect of Rd on the secrecy rate of the
proposed JRJS scheme. As stated in section III, transmission
rate Rd plays an important role in the secrecy rate results
mainly due to two reasons. One reason is that different
transmission rates lead to different decoding sets where the
relay is selected, which can be seen from (10). The other
reason is that secrecy rate results of the proposed FCSI-PA
and PCSI-PA JRJS schemes are effected by Pb1 and Pb3
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which both are the functions of Rd. It is noted that, in our
experiments, we use Rd ≤ log2( E(|hsr|
2)E(|hrd|
2)
E(|hsr|2)+E(|hrd|2)
P
δ2
n
+ 1)
instead of (26) as the guideline for Rd, which is easier to
implement. Fig. 3 shows the secrecy rates of our proposed
FCSI-PA and PCSI-PA JRJS schemes versus Rd in the case
of P = 14 dBm. In Fig. 3, we can see that secrecy rate
increases as Rd increases from 1 bit/s/Hz to 3 bit/s/Hz and
then decreases as Rd increases from 3 bit/s/Hz to 4 bit/s/Hz.
The reason is that, when a higher transmission rate Rd is used,
Ps|hsr|2 needs to be larger to make sure that the relay can
successfully decode the source signal, which will lead to a
higher Cd (see (11)) along with a higher secrecy rate. However,
when Rd is too high, Ps needs to be even larger for the sake
of successfully decoding the source signal, which would lead
to a even smaller Pr under the total power constraint. In this
case, due to Cd = 12 log2(1+
min(|hsr|
2Ps,|hrd|
2Pr)
δ2
n
) (see (11)),
a lower Cd along with a lower secrecy rate would be obtained.
As shown in Fig. 3, the highest secrecy rate is obtained when
Rd = 3 bit/s/Hz is used in the case of P = 14 dBm.
Considering the effect of Rd on secrecy rate results and the
upper bound of Rd, we set Rd = 0.5 bit/s/Hz, Rd = 1 bit/s/Hz,
Rd = 2 bit/s/Hz, Rd = 3 bit/s/Hz and Rd = 4 bit/s/Hz in the
case of P ∈ [0, 3] dBm, P ∈ (3, 6] dBm, P ∈ (6, 10] dBm,
P ∈ (10, 15] dBm and P ∈ (15, 20] dBm, respectively, by
experimental experience.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the secrecy rate results of our
Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus transmission rate Rd of FCSI-PA JRJS and
PCSI-PA JRJS in the case of P = 14 dBm.
proposed JRJS schemes with FCSI-PA and PCSI-PA strate-
gies, respectively, versus the total power P with M = 10.
Pure relay selection, pure jamming, direct transmission and
GSVD based beaforming [37]-[38] schemes are used as bench-
mark schemes. The transmission rates used in the benchmark
schemes are the same as those in the proposed JRJS schemes.
In our experiments, we set E(|hsd|2) = 0.05 so that the direct
link from the source to the destination is negligible to match
the wireless network illustrated in Fig. 1. In the pure relay
selection scheme, the relay is selected in a similar way as that
in the proposed JRJS scheme without considering jamming.
Transmit power at the source and relay is equally allocated.
In the pure jamming scheme, all the intermediate nodes are
used as jammers to transmit null-steering artificial noise with
the total power P2 and the transmit power at the source is
set to P2 . Since the relay selection is effected by |hse|2 in
pure relay selection scheme, different relays may be selected
under FCSI and PCSI assumptions, which are distinguished as
FCSI and PCSI pure relay selection schemes, respectively. In
the GSVD scheme, all the intermediate nodes in the decoding
set are used as the relays for signal transmission with a total
power P2 and no artificial noise is used. In the GSVD scheme
under the FCSI assumption (denoted as FCSI-GSVD), the
transmission is performed based on GSVD of the instanta-
neous CSI of the channel from the relays to the destination
and the channel from the relays to the eavesdropper, while
in the GSVD scheme under the PCSI assumption (denoted as
PCSI-GSVD), the transmission is performed based on GSVD
of the instantaneous CSI of the channel from the relays to
the destination and the statistical CSI of the channel from
the relays to the eavesdropper. Here we compute Cd in the
GSVD scheme as the minimum of the channel capacity from
the source to the relays and the channel capacity from the
relays to the destination, i.e., Cd = min(Csr , Crd) (equation
(7)). It is noted that when multiple intermediate nodes are
selected as the relays, the channel capacity from the source to
the relays should be the mininum of the channel capacity from
the source to each relay so that all the relays can successfully
decode the source signal and then transmit their re-encoded
outcomes.
As shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, both the proposed FCSI-
PA and PCSI-PA JRJS schemes outperform the pure relay
selection, the pure jamming, direct transmission and the cor-
responding GSVD schemes in terms of secrecy rate, implying
the security benefits of exploiting JRJS with power allocation
to defend against eavesdropping attack. It is noted that under
the FCSI assumption, the proposed JRJS scheme performs
better than the GSVD scheme in terms of secrecy rate mainly
due to that the former achieves a higher Cd. The reason is
that the proposed FCSI-PA scheme selects a relay to forward
the source signal, which can lead to a higher channel capacity
from the source to the relay, compared to the FCSI-GSVD
scheme which exploits multiple relays. Therefore, although
the FCSI-GSVD scheme generally leads to a higher capacity
from the relays to the destination when a lower Rd is used, it
still achieves a lower Cd since Cd = min(Csr , Crd).
Fig. 6 shows the secrecy rate results of the proposed JRJS
schemes using FCSI-PA, PCSI-PA and EPA strategies versus
total power P with M = 10. In the EPA scheme, transmit
power at the source Ps, the relay Pr and all the jammers Pz
is specified as P2 ,
P
4 ,
P
4 . That is, the transmit power in the first
and second phase are allocated equally; the transmit power at
the relay and the total transmit power at all the jammers in
the second phase is allocated equally. We have also tested
another fixed power allocation scheme where the transmit
power at each intermediate node is equally allocated, that is,
Ps =
P
2 , Pr =
P
2M , Pz =
P
2 − P2M , and obtained lower secrecy
rate results than those obtained using the aforementioned EPA
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus total transmit power P of FCSI-PA JRJS, FCSI-
GSVD based beamforming, FCSI pure relay selection, pure jamming and
direct transmission schemes in the case of M = 10.
Fig. 5. Secrecy rate versus total transmit power P of PCSI-PA JRJS, PCSI-
GSVD based beamforming, PCSI pure relay selection, pure jamming and
direct transmission schemes in the case of M = 10.
scheme. As observed in Fig. 6, the proposed power allocation
strategies outperform the EPA strategies under both the FCSI
and PCSI assumptions, showing the efficiency of proposed
power allocation schemes.
Fig. 7 shows the relationship between the solved sub-
optimal transmit power at source/relay and the number of
intermediate nodes M in the case of P = 14 dBm. Power
ratios Ps/P and Pr/P are used. As shown in Fig. 7, both
Ps/P and Pr/P decrease as M increases from 3 to 10 and
keep almost unchanged when M increases from 10 to 20. That
means, for the sake of maximizing the secrecy rate of proposed
JRJS scheme, the power allocated to transmit the source signal
should increase with M and tend towards almost fixed when
M > 10 given the total power P .
Fig. 8 shows the secrecy rate results of our proposed
FCSI-PA and PCSI-PA JRJS schemes versus the number of
Fig. 6. Secrecy rate versus total transmit power P of FCSI-PA, PCSI-PA,
FCSI-EPA and PCSI-EPA JRJS schemes in the case of M = 10.
Fig. 7. sub-optimal power ratios Ps/P and Pr/P versus the number of
intermediate nodes M of FCSI-PA and PCSI-PA JRJS schemes in the case
of P = 14 dBm.
intermediate nodes M in the case of P = 14 dBm. It can be
easily seen that, the secrecy rates of proposed JRJS schemes
improve notably as M increases. It means that the physical-
layer security of wireless communications relying on the
proposed JRJS schemes can be further enhanced by employing
more intermediate nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new JRJS scheme for
improving the physical-layer security of a wireless DF relay
systems. Given multiple intermediate nodes available, the
proposed JRJS scheme selects one node to act as the relay,
while the remaining intermediate nodes are enabled as the
friendly jammers for transmitting artificial noise against the
eavesdropper. We examined the power allocation among
the source, relay and friendly jammers to maximize the
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Fig. 8. Secrecy rate versus the number of intermediate nodes M of FCSI-PA
and PCSI-PA JRJS schemes in the case of P = 14 dBm.
secrecy rate of proposed JRJS scheme with a total power
constraint. We derived closed-form sub-optimal solutions
to the formulated power allocation problems under FCSI
and PCSI assumptions, respectively. The relay and jammer
selection as well as power allocation were considered jointly.
Numerical results showed that the proposed JRJS framework
outperforms the conventional pure relay selection, pure
jamming and GSVD based beamforming methods in terms
of secrecy rate. Also, the proposed FCSI-PA and PCSI-PA
schemes are shown to achieve higher secrecy rates than the
corresponding EPA strategies. Moreover, the secrecy rate
of proposed JRJS framework relying on the FCSI-PA and
PCSI-PA schemes can be improved by increasing the number
of intermediate nodes.
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